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AUTHOR'S NOTE:
Ohio has recently amended its Rape statute to reflect many of the views
set forth in this Note. Particularly, § 2907.02 (G) provides that it is not
a defense to a rape charge that the offender and the victim were
married or were cohabitating at the time of the commission of the
offense. The amendment became effective July 1, 1996.
[A] female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is
considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last
familiarity. Not so the wife: however brutal a tyrant she may
unfortunately be chained to-though she may know that he hates her,
though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may
feel it impossible not to loathe him-he can claim her and enforce the
lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the
instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, a man could not be prosecuted for raping his wife. 2 This
inability to prosecute was based on the common law definition of rape itself, 3
which exempted husbands from criminal liability.4 Since the late 1970's,
however, several states have partially or completely abolished the common law
marital rape exemption. 5 Notably, the abolishment has been accomplished
through both legislative enactments and judicial decisions. 6 Those seeking to
completely eradicate the marital rape exemption have not enjoyed success in

1

JOHN S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 226 (E.
Neff ed. 1926).
2

DAvID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE 1 (1985)[hereinafter FINKELHOR

& YLLOJ.
3

Common law rape was defined as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and
against her will." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210.
4

See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 380 (1975). The exemption of
husbands from rape prosecutions can be traced to our biblical forefathers interpretation
of the definition of rape. Any carnal knowledge outside the marriage contract was
deemed unlawful, while any carnal knowledge within the marriage contract was
considered lawful. Id.
5Oregon, in 1977, was one of the firststates in the United States to completely abolish
the marital rape exemption from their statute, following Nebraska's lead in 1976. This
was the beginning of a trend to change and abolish the marital exemption throughout
the United States. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.305-163.375 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319
(1991).
6See DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE INMARRIAGE 375-82 (1990) (Appendix IHprovides
an updated state-by-state analysis of what the marital rape exemption law is in every
state).
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every state. Today there are still a large number of states which have not
repealed the exemption totally, but have instead permitted a partial exemption
allowing a husband to be exempt from prosecution for "raping" his wife under
8
certain circumstances. 7 Ohio still retains such a partial exemption.
It is the position of this Note that true equality between women and men can
never exist until every state has completely abolished the marital rape
exemption. This abolishment would give every woman, married or unmarried,
the freedom to control her own body.9 The purpose of this Note is to encourage
legislators, and those who influence them across the United States, to complete
the abolishment of the marital rape exemption. Part II of this Note presents an
analysis of the common law origins and legal justifications for the marital
exemption. Part III examines the progressive groundbreaking states which
have set the pace in the national campaign for complete abolishment. In
addition, a current breakdown of every state's law will also be discussed. In
Part IV, Ohio's handling of the marital rape exemption will be examined, and
the debate surrounding the need for reform of Ohio's marital rape law will be
closely analyzed. Part V concludes by suggesting ways in which the complete
abolishment of spousal immunity may be achieved to promote equality for
women in the legal system.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE MARITAL ExEMPTION
A. The Exemption

An unsupported, extrajudicial statement made by British jurist, Sir Matthew
Hale gave birth to the marital rape exemption at common law when he declared
"[b]ut the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
10
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." For
more than 330 years this statement has been the justification for the marital
rape exemption, as well as serving as the backbone for judicial recognition of
spousal immunity in the United States since 1857.11
Hale's lack of authority for the marital exemption was first criticized by the
English Justice Field as early as 1888, when he stated "[t]he authority of Hale

7

1d. at 23.
8See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (Anderson 1993).
9

Martin D. Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for Criminal Rape Prosecution,7 VT. L.

REV. 33, 51 (1982).
101 SIR MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 629 (Emlin ed.
1736).

11In Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857), the court, using Sir
Hale's statement as authority, held that a husband could not be convicted of raping his
wife. This Massachusetts case was the first in the United States to adopt Sir Hale's
statement as law. Several other courts followed. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 25 So. 372, 372
(La. 1899); Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
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C.J. on such matter is undoubtedly as high as any can be but no other authority2
is cited by him for this proposition and I should hesitate before I adopt it."1
Hale's lack of authority has led many courts to criticize his statement and to
13
rule that the marital exemption is not implicit in the common law. Despite
14
woman-hater,
"rabid
a
as
these rulings, and the fact that Hale was known
Hale's statement has traditionally been accepted as the foundation for spousal
immunity. Indeed, several additional theories for the marital rape exemption
have evolved from this unsupported statement.
B. The Common Law Originsfor the Marital Rape Exemption
1. Implied Consent and Contract Theory
The most common rationale for the marital rape exemption is Hale's notion
that a marriage constitutes a contract. The terms of this contract include a wife's
irrevocable consent to have sexual intercourse with her husband, whenever he
wishes. 15 This has fostered the notion that a husband has a "marital right" to
sexual intercourse. According to the theory of implied consent, marital rape
can never occur because all sexual contact within a marriage is assumed to be
16
consensual.
The notion of a husband's implied contractual right to sex has been criticized
on several grounds. First, implied consent in rape law is inconsistent with the
17
notion of consent in all other areas of criminal law. The law does not allow a
12 See Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23,57 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
13 Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847,850 (Va. 1984).
Hale's statement was not law, common or otherwise. At best it was
Hale's pronouncement of what he observed to be a custom in 17th
century England. Yet, unlike other customs which form the basis of
common law, it nowhere appears that Hale, in making his statement,
set forth a general rule of conduct of such long-standing acceptability ....
Id. Seealso State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1981), where the court also held that since
there was no authority cited for Hale's statement, "[sluch a declaration cannot itself be
considered a definitive and binding statement of the common law, although legal commentators have often restated the rule since the time of Hale without evaluating its
merits."
14
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 163. Some have argued that Hale "made his
mark among his contemporaries by burning women at the stake as witches." Id.
15

BROWNMLLER, supra note 4, at 380.

16

Anne L. Buckborough, Note, Family Law: Recent Developments in the Law of Marital
Rape, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 345. For a discussion on the common law origin of
implied consent, seegenerally Sallee F. Waterman, Comment, For Better or Worse: Marital
Rape, 15 N. Ky. L. REV. 611,613-14 (1988); Abigail A. Tierney, Comment, Spousal Sexual
Assault, Pennsylvania'sPlace on the Sliding Scale of Protectionfrom Marital Rape, 90 DICK.
L. REV. 777, 781 (1986); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 311-13
(1977) [hereinafter Note, MaritalRape Exemption].
17Maria Pracher, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of
Privacy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 730 (1981).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/7
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18
person to consent to serious bodily harm or injury inflicted by another. To the
contrary, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from
serious bodily harm. Likewise, such an interest bars the state from recognizing
a theory of implied consent to the tremendous harms resulting from forced
sexual intercourse. 19 A woman may consent to sexual intercourse with her
husband when she desires, but to assume that a married woman consents to
20
be harmed exceeds the limits of the law.
The most widespread criticism of the implied consent theory is that the
theory does not exist outside of rape law.2 1 Domestic relations law shows that
in several instances a woman may withhold consent to sexual intercourse with
her husband. 22 Therefore, if she can withhold her consent from her husband's
demands at specific instances during marriage, the implied consent theory
23
undercuts the basic rationale for upholding spousal immunity. For these
reasons the doctrine of implied consent has been widely criticized by several
courts and is thus generally rejected as a justification for the marital rape
exemption. 24
The contract theory, also based on Hale's statement, is intertwined with the
implied consent theory. Under the contract theory, Hale stated that when a
woman marries, she gives up her rights to her body because she has formed a
25
contract with her husband that cannot be retracted. Those opposed to the
marital rape exemption suggest that the matrimonial contract is not a valid

18

Id.

9

1 Jan M. Glasgow, The MaritalRape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18 J.
FAm. L. 565, 567 (1980).
20

Pracher, supra note 17, at 730. See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 165. A
1967 opinion of an Israeli Judge stressed that any imposition of harm to a woman will
nullify the implied consent to sexual intercourse. "Even though a woman agrees by her
marriage to live with her husband as man and wife, she does not thereby agree to suffer
severe bodily harm." Id.
21Pracher, supra note 17, at 730-31. See also Glasgow, supra note 19, at 567-68.
22

Glasgow, supra note 19, at 568. These instances include the fact that divorces have
been granted when there have been excessive sexual demands made upon the wife
which were cruel and demeaning. Also, in divorce law there is the legal concept of
"condonation" which states that the wife has a right to refuse sexual intercourse with
her husband to avoid condoning his marital disloyalties. Id. See also Note, MaritalRape
Exemption, supra note 16, at 312. Courts have in several cases refused to grant husbands
divorces because their wives refused to have sex with them. Id.
23

Glasgow, supra note 19, at 568.

24

See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 42 (N.J. 1981); Accord People v. DeStefano, 467
N.Y.S.2d 506, 514 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d
847, 850 (Va. 1984).
25

HALE, supra note 10.
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contract at all. 26 "[I]ts provisions are unwritten, its penalties unspecified, and
the terms of the contract are typically unknown to the 'contracting' parties.
Prospective spouses are neither informed of the terms of the contract nor are
they allowed any options about these terms."2 7
Two additional arguments have been made to discredit the contract theory.
First, under contract law, private parties are not permitted to use self-help
methods to remedy a contract breach; normally this must be done through the
courts. 28 Further, the remedy for breach of contract for personal services is not
specific performance. Personal services are unique, and contract law does not
require a person to perform against her will. 29 Hence, even if it were to be
accepted that a woman breached the marital contract by not having sexual
intercourse with her husband, the husband should not be able to enforce the
contract by physically forcing his wife to have sexual intercourse.3 0 The fact
that the matrimonial "contract" does not resemble a true contract at all is one
of the strongest legal arguments for its outright rejection. 31
2. Women as Property

Another common law origin which was a building-block in the foundation
for the marital rape exemption was the idea that a husband owned his wife as
chattel. Since a husband could not take what he already owned, a husband was
no more capable of raping his wife than an owner was of stealing his own
property.32 Since women were regarded as property, the common law treated
rape not as a crime against women, but rather as a violation of a man's property
interest.33 The rape laws were concerned with protecting a husband's property
interest in his wife's fidelity, and a father's interest in his daughter's virginity.34
26
Lenora Weitzman, Note, Legal Regulationsof Marriage: Traditionand Change, 62 CAL.
L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1974).
27

1d. See generallyROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 95 (1984).

28

Pracher, supra note 17, at 729.

29

1d. See also Geannie A. Morris, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 27 Loy. L. REV.
597, 598 (1981).
30

Susan Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 1088, 1088 (1980). It is
also suggested that a contract does not exist at all because there is not an objective
manifestation of intent to agree. A bride does not agree to give up her right to bodily
freedom or to any sexual force or brutality. Id.
31
In State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (Essex County Ct. 1977), the court rejects the
application of contract law to marital rape because "[s]uch a mechanical application of
principles of contract law are illogically applied in the area of forcible sexual invasions."
Id.
32

Charlotte L. Mitra, "...For She Has no Right or Power to Refuse Her Consent", 1979 CRIM.
L. REV. 558, 560.
33
Note, To Have and to Hold: The MaritalRape Exemption and the FourteenthA mendmen t,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986) [hereinafter Note, To Have and To Hold].
34Id. Rape of an unmarried women decreased her value to a future husband, and

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/7
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The notion of women as property, however, was founded on premises which
are no longer prevalent in our society and which have strongly been rejected
in our legal system today.35
3. Marital Unity
The final common law rationale for the marital rape exemption was that,

upon marriage, the wife's identity merged into the existence of her husband.
In 1765, Blackstone stated "[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person
in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of

the husband; under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs
everything .... -36 This became known as the marital unities doctrine, which
provided that a woman could not own property, make contracts, or take part
in litigation.3 7 This doctrine made the rape of a woman by her husband a legal
38
impossibility since a man could not rape himself.
Blackstone's unity theory lost support in the late nineteenth century with the
39
adoption of the Married Women's Property Act. This Act recognized
women's legal personhood, but assigned her a distinct place in society, which
40
was the home, different from that of a man. This became known as the
41
separate spheres doctrine and it gradually replaced the unities theory. Since
women today are part of all the "spheres" of society, the ancient marital unities
and separate spheres doctrines have been rejected by courts as justifications for

the marital rape exemption. 42

rape of a married woman brought embarrassment and disgrace to her husband. Id.
35

See, e.g., People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980)("Nowhere in the common-law
world-indeed in any modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel .....
361 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
37

For a discussion of the unities doctrine see Tiemey, supra note 16, at 781. See also
Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,223 (Ga. 1985); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38,44 (N.J. 1981);
People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,573 (N.Y. 1984).
38
See Tiemey, supra note 16, at 781.
39
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 177 (1982).
40

Id.

41

1d. Under the separate spheres doctrine the husband was the public representative
of the couple as well as the breadwinner, while the wife was responsible for taking care
of the family. This gave women an identity and an important role to fill in society. At
least it was an improvement over the unities doctrine. See Note, To Have and to Hold,
supra note 33, at 1257; Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's
Subordinationand the Role of Law, in POLITICS OF THE LAw 117,125 (1982).
42

See, e.g., People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 512 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983);
Trammel v. United States 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) ("Nowhere in the common-law
world-indeed in any modem society-is a woman . . . demeaned by denial of a
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C. Modern Justifications
Historical common law justifications for the marital rape exemption no
longer have any legitimacy in the 20th century United States where women are
presumed to be equal. Unfortunately, modem arguments have been formed by
supporters of the marital exemption to foster the outdated patriarchal notions
about women in marriage. 43 There are five modem justifications espoused by
those who defend the marital rape exemption. Once closely examined,
however, it is apparent these arguments are without merit.
1. Marital Rape is Not as Serious as Other Rape
Defenders of the marital rape exemption have argued that there is both a
quantitative and qualitative difference between marital rape and non-marital
rape.44 The quantitative argument is that marital rape does not occur often
enough in our society to be recognized as a problem.4 5 The qualitative
argument is that the damage to a wife from a marital rape is less severe than
the damage caused to a victim of non-marital rape. 46
Dealing with the quantitative argument first, it is unreasonable to believe
that rape does not occur in marriage. Existing data suggests that 14% of married
women have been raped by their husbands at least once. 4 7 This is a significant
number of marital rape victims. However, even if there was only one woman
a year who suffered this indignity, numbers alone should not determine the
criminality of an act.4 8 Any lack of quantitative information may be due to the
fact that marital rape in most states was nota crime until recently, and therefore

separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human
being.").
43
See generally Martin D. Schwartz & Gerald T. Slatin, The Law on Marital Rape: How
do Marxism and Feminism Explain its Persistence, 8 ALSA F.: A J.OF INTERDISCIPLINARY
LEGAL STUDIES 244, 247 (1984); Michael D. Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife,
Who[m] Can You Rape?": The MaritalRape Exemption Re-examined, 15 FAM. L. Q., Spring

1981, at 8-9.
44
For a discussion of this modem justification see generallySchwartz, supra note 9, at
42-46; Waterman, supra note 16, at 617-19; Tiemey, supra note 16, at 778-80.
45

Schwartz, supra note 9, at 42-43.

46

d. at 43.
RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 2. Ms. Russell conducted a survey of 930 women who had
been married and found that 14% of them were raped at least once. Id. Applied to the
population, the results suggested that one out of every seven women who had ever been
married was raped at least once byher husband. Id. "Inother words, we all know women
who have been raped by husbands." Id. See also FNKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 6-7.
They also conducted a survey and found that 10% of the women who had been married
said that their husbands used force to try to get them to have sex with them. Id.
47

48

See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 48.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/7
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wives were not reporting the incident as rape.49 Other possible reasons for the
lack of reporting include the destruction of the marriage and family, the fear
that reporting the crime will be useless, and that the investigative process and
accompanying backlash from the guilty spouse may be worse than the crime
itself.50
Furthermore, the qualitative argument suggests that marital rape is not a
serious crime since the victim does not suffer as much as a non-marital rape
victim. 51 This argument is also unreasonable. Significant evidence suggests
that marital rape can be the most traumatic form of rape, more traumatic than
rape by strangers, because of a sense of betrayal, disillusionment, the upset of
52
the whole marriage, and the fact that rape may be repeated for several years.
One study reported that victims of spousal rape tended to suffer trauma longer
than other victims. 53
In addition to psychological injuries, marital rape victims also suffer more
physical injuries than other rape victims.54 Studies have shown that women
will resist their husbands to a greater degree than other victims will resist
strangers because they are less afraid of their husbands. 55 Still, the most
distressing thing about marital rape is that a woman will have to face her rapist
daily and be constantly reminded of the extreme violation by her husband.
Clearly, there is enough quantitative and qualitative evidence to suggest that
marital rape is serious and that our legal system needs to address it.

49

1d. See also Waterman, supra note 16, at 618.

50See Pamela L. Wood, The Victim, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 347-48 (1973).
51

See Michael G. Hilf, Marital Privacyand Spousal Rape, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 31, 41

(1980).
[A] married person has, to some extent, a lesser expectation of personal
autonomy; therefore, the affront to one's autonomy is less in the case of
spousal rape than in the case of ordinary rape. Moreover, the harm caused
by spousal rape would seem to be less severe than the harm caused by
non-spousal rape. While a married person's interest in bodily integrity
is not inconsiderable, a balance must be struck between the individual's
interest in private autonomy and the public policy favoring spousal
immunity.
Id.
52 RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 359. See also FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 137-38.
53
RUSSELL, supranote 6, at 193. Of the women raped by their husband, 52% reported
that the long term effects were severe, as opposed to 39% of women who were raped by
strangers. Id.
54
1d. at 90. A study showed that 10% of married women experience both wife rape
and wife beating. Id.

55 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 45.
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2. Problem of Proving a Marital Rape Case
The second argument offered in support of keeping the marital rape
exemption is that it would be impossible to prove a marital rape case when the
couple has had consensual sex, perhaps hundreds of times before. 56 Opponents
of this argument have claimed that it is possible to prove lack of consent even
in a situation where a wife's word is placed against against her husband's.
Corroborating evidence, such as evidence of physical force through medical
57
testimony, may be available.
Even though convictions may be rare due to the difficulty in proving lack of
consent, this is not a valid reason for failing to criminalize marital rape. 58 Other
crimes, such as treason, 59 incest, 60 and acquaintance rape6 l also present
potentially difficult prosecutions, yet these are still considered crimes. The
"difficulty of proof has never been a proper criterion for deciding what behavior
should be officially censured by society."62 Certainly the public policy of
protecting a woman from the violent crime of rape by any person, especially
her husband, is outweighed by the argument that it may be difficult to prove
lack of consent. 63
Additionally, other arguments that have been advanced to support the
criminalization of marital rape have farthered the concepts of law as a deterrent
and law as an educational tool.64 It has been argued that once marital rape is
considered a crime, husbands may be deterred from raping their wives out of
the fear of being punished. 65 Furthermore, if marital rape is criminalized, the
public would be more willing to accept the fact that marital rape does occur
and is illegal. 66 Husbands need to be made aware that raping of their wives is
socially unacceptable. 67 This goal can be advanced through the complete
56

See FINKELHOR & YLLo, supra note 2, at 176.

57

Pracher, supra note 17, at 732.

8

5 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 48. See also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y.
1984) (stating that proving lack of consent in a rape prosecution is very difficult, but it
is not a sufficient rationale for maintaining the marital rape exemption).
59

See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 48.

60FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 178.
61

Pracher, supra note 17, at 732.

62

FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 177.

63

Pracher, supra note 17, at 732.

64

See generally, Schwartz, supra note 9, at 50-51.

65

1d.

66

Id.
1d. at 51. 'Ifthe continuation of the marital rape exemption protects male property

67

interests, removal of the exemption asserts the right of married women to the physical

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/7
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abolishment of the marital exemption. As the abolishment of the marital
exemption would do more than just prosecute husbands, the problem of
proving lack of consent is not a persuasive argument for continuing to uphold
the marital exemption.
3. Increase in False Rape Accusations
The third modern justification for spousal immunity is that the
criminalization of marital rape will lead to women filing false rape charges in
68
order to gain leverage in divorce and custody proceedings. This argument,
predicated on the assumption that women are vindictive liars, is unconvincing
for several reasons. 69
70
First, our criminal justice system is designed to handle fabricated claims.
Indeed, "our jurisprudence is designed to test the very truth or falsity of
71
accusations in all criminal proceedings." There is no legitimate reason to
suggest that courts could not expose false accusations of marital rape as
skillfully as they expose falsehoods of other alleged crimes. Furthermore,
courts have acknowledged that if the likelihood of false accusations were a
reason to avoid criminalizing certain activities, then nothing other than murder
would be a crime. 72
In addition, the law recognizes a wife's ability to bring charges against her
husband for other criminal acts.73 If women wanted to seek revenge against
74
their husbands, they could do so by filing false charges of assault and battery.
At least one court has expressed doubt that women will make false accusations
of rape to obtain better divorce settlements because "the offense of battery
which can now be exerted by one spouse against another has not been used for
such purpose ... "75
The final weakness with the argument that women take advantage of the
legal system by filing false rape charges is the failure to recognize the social

integrity of their bodies, and of the right to choose what uses their bodies will be put
to." Id.
68
For a discussion of this rationale see generally Schwartz, supra note 9, at 51-53;
Pracher, supra note 17, at 732-36; Waterman, supra note 16, at 616-17.
69
For a discussion on "women as liars" see TONG, supra note 27, at 100-02.
7
OState v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (Essex County Ct. 1977).
71

1d.

72

People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,574 (N.Y. 1984).

73

Smith, 372 A.2d at 389.

74

1d.

75

State v. Smith, 401 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Schwartz,
supra note 9, at 53. In several jurisdictions where spousal rape prosecutions are allowed,
there has been no reason to believe that false accusations are being filed. Id.
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stigma attached to rape. 76 The reality is that rape victims are hesitant to report
the crime due to this social stigma. 7 'Thus it is much more likely that the
extraordinary woman who is bent on blackmail or revenge would choose a
tactic which is less embarrassing for her and more likely to result in punishment
for her purported assailant."78
4. Criminal Law Should Not Invade the Sanctity of Marriage
Defenders of the marital exemption who believe that it protects the sanctity
of marriage argue that the criminalization of marital rape will destroy any
chance of reconciliation and will violate marital privacy.79 It is indeed likely
that a rape prosecution by a wife against her husband would destroy the
possibility of reconciliation. However, the tenuousness of this argument lies in
the assumption that a marriage of this type is worth saving.80 A marriage where
rape is involved may not be worthy of preservation. 81 The Supreme Court of
Virginia argued against this justification by stating:
It is hard to imagine how charging a husband with the violent crime
of rape can be more disruptive of a marriage than the violent act itself.
Moreover, if the marriage has already deteriorated to the point where
that
intercourse must be commanded at
82 the price of violence we doubt
there is anything left to reconcile.
Our society should not attempt to protect a decaying and violent marriage84by
suggesting reconciliation 83 at the expense of a woman's continuing abuse.

76

Schwartz, supra note 9, at 52-53.

77

Id. at 53. See also Barry,supra note 30, at 1091.

78

Note, MaritalRape Exemption, supra note 16, at 315.

79

See Waterman, supra note 16, at 614-15.

80Note, Marital Rape in California: For Better or For Worse, 8 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 239,
251 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Rape in California].SeeHilf,supra note 51, at 34. Hilf suggests
that a curtain should be drawn around the husband and wife to keep the public out and
the spouses in together in order to reconcile their differences. Id. See also Morris, supra
note 29, at 602.
81Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984).
82

Id.

83

Morris, supra note 29, at 602.

84

See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 179.
Without the social support of a criminal law stating that she has
been wronged, she may continue to tolerate the abuse .... To stack
the legal deck in the direction of "salvaging" her marriage may mean
consigning her to ten more years of abuse. Marriages where marital
rape had occurred should not be saved at any cost.
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Supporters of this modem justification also suggest that the marital
exemption avoids interference with marital privacy.85 This argument is
problematic. Although our legal system prefers to avoid interfering with
problems between spouses, the state has a valid interest in preventing violent
sexual assaults. 86 The highest court in the State of New York held that "just as
a husband cannot invoke a right of marital privacy to escape liability for beating
his wife, he cannot justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right to
privacy."8 7 Because the state intervenes in other areas of domestic violence,
such as wife beating, there is no valid reason to exclude marital rape as an area
unworthy of state protection. 88
5. Other Remedies Exist
The last of the arguments offered by marital exemption defenders holds that
a marital rape victim can pursue other legal remedies, such as assault charges
and divorce. 89 Although true, these alternative remedies are inadequate. There
is a qualitative difference between the crime of rape and the crime of assault.90
"The fact that rape statutes exist ... is a recognition that the harm caused by a
forcible rape is different, and more severe, than the harm caused by an ordinary
assault."91 Rape laws, unlike assault and battery laws, recognize that rape is a
psychological crime, as well as a physical one, which deeply harms a woman's
deal with the crime of rape,
sexual integrity.92 If assault laws were sufficient9to
3
there would be no reason to have rape statutes.
Another reason why assault law is an inadequate remedy for marital rape
victims is that not all women who are raped by their husbands are physically
assaulted or battered. 94 If marital rape is not a crime, then these women do not
have a prosecutorial remedy.95 Furthermore, rape penalties are more severe

85Note, Rape in California,supra note 80, at 246.
86People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,574 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Supreme Court
of New York recognized that the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 469 (1965),
only extended the right of marital privacy to include consensual acts).
87

Id.

88Note, Rape in California,supra note 80, at 247.
89

For an excellent detailed discussion of this justification see FINKELHOR & YLLO,
supra note 2, at 181-85.
90People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,574 (N.Y. 1984).
91

id.

92

FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 182.

93

Id.

94See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 89. It is estimated from a survey of 644 women who
had been raped during marriage that 4% experienced rape without beating. Id.
95

Waterman, supra note 16, at 620.
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than assault penalties; grouping marital rape together with assault will not
sufficiently deter men from raping their wives.96
Divorce is often offered as an alternative remedy when a woman is raped by
her husband. 97 While true, this remedy shifts the burden to the woman. It
makes more sense to suggest that if a man is dissatisfied with his sexual marital
relationship, he should seek a divorce instead of raping his wife. 98 Hence, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that "[i]f her repeated refusals are a 'breach'
of marriage 'contract,' his remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in violent or
forceful self-help." 99
The "alternative remedies" justification is an easy way for supporters of the
marital exemption to evade the quandary posed by marital rape. All of these
modem justifications have been advanced to stem the growing tide of states
which have abolished the exemption. The next logical step in the national
campaign for complete abolishment of the marital exemption, is to change the
partial exemptions in the majority of the states to reflect complete abolishment
of any vestiges of spousal immunity. This can be achieved either through
statutory changes or judicial decisions. The starting point is with an analysis
of changes and decisions in groundbreaking, progressive states.
III. PROGRESSIVE MARITAL RAPE STATES: TREND TOWARD ABOLITION
A. Statutory Abolishment: Oregon
In 1977 the Oregon legislature, following Nebraska's lead in 1976,100 deleted
the spousal immunity clause from its rape statute. 10 1 This deletion allowed for
the prosecution of husbands who engaged in non-consensual intercourse with
their wives. A year later Oregon became the first state to prosecute a husband
for raping his wife. 102 In the case of State v. Rideout,103 John Rideout became
96

FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 183.

97

1d. at 184.

98

See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 53.

99

State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. 1981).

100Even though Nebraska was the first state to abolish the marital exemption,
Nebraska's experience is not discussed here because the state did not have a single
prosecution under the new statute for six years, until 1982. FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra
note 2, at 170.
101 RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 18. Oregon's rape statute reads "[a] person who has sexual
intercourse with another person commits the crime of rape in the first degree if: (a) The
victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person..." OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375(1)
(1991). There is no mention of "spouse" anywhere in the statute. Id.
102

RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 18. The Director of the National Clearinghouse on Marital
& Date Rape, Laura X, has led a national campaign to abolish the marital rape exemption
for the past two decades. The National Clearinghouse on Marital & Date Rape is located
at 2325 Oak Street, Berkeley, CA 94708-1697.
103 No. 108,866 (Marion County Cir. Ct., Or. Dec. 17, 1978) (unreported).
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the first husband in the United States charged with the rape of his wife while
the two were married and living together.104
Of all marital rape cases and trials, the Rideout case is the most well known
because it brought the issues of marital rape to the forefront of the nation's
awareness. 105 The trial itself arose from an incident that occurred on October
10, 1978.106 According to testimony given at trial, Greta Rideout testified that
her husband, John, awoke from a nap and demanded that she have sex with
him. 107 When she refused, he became violent, 108 grabbed her and, "under a rain
of threats and blows, forced her to engage in sexual intercourse with him."109
John Rideout was acquitted on December 27, 1978 of the charge of first
degree rape.110 The jurors decided that John Rideout could not be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because they were not sure that Greta's story could
be trusted.11 1 The outcome of this case was seen by those who opposed
Oregon's new rape statute as a confirmation that the state should not become
involved in marital relationships. 112 It was also seen as a step backward by
113
those who believed Greta's story and who favored the legal reform.
Although the Rideout case resulted in an acquittal, it had a positive effect in
that it encouraged women to campaign strongly for the abolishment of the
marital exemption in those states where a husband could not yet be prosecuted
114
for raping his wife.

104
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 172. Rideout was not the first instance of a man
being prosecuted for raping his wife in the United States, but it was the first case where
the husband was still living with his wife. Id.

105 RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 19.
106 FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 171.

1l 7 .
108

Id.

109

d. For a further discussion of John and Greta's relationship and the incidents that
occurred which led up to the trial see Moira K. Griffin, In 44 States, it's Legal to Rape Your
Wife, 9 STUDENT LAWYER, Sept. 1980 at 21-23.
110d at 23.
1i1d.
112 RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 20. See also Barry,supra note 30, at 1090, where the defense
attorney in the case, Charles Burt, used the common law origins as a justification for the
marital exemption: "it points out the absurdity of bringing the crime of rape as a law
into marriage. [A] woman who's still in a marriage is presumably consenting to sex...
maybe this is the risk of being married, you know?" Id.
1 13

RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 20.

114

Griffin, supra note 109, at 23.
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B. JudicialAbolishment: New York
Judicial abolishment provides an additional method of eliminating the
marital rape exemption. In New York, the marital exemption was abolished in
the landmark case of People v. Liberta.115 In this case, the defendant-husband
lived apart from his wife pursuant to a restraining order which required the
defendant to stay away from his wife, but allowed him to visit his son on the
weekends. 116 After missing a visit, the defendant arranged to meet his wife and
son at the motel where the defendant resided. 117 The defendant promised his
wife that a friend would be present the entire time, however, the friend
departed and the defendant forcibly raped and sodomized his wife in front of
their two and one-half year old son.1 18
Although New York's statute for rape 119 contained a marital exemption, the
defendant was prosecuted under the statutory provision which deemed him
unmarried because he was living apart from his wife pursuant to a court
order. 120 The defendant appealed the application of this exception and
challenged the constitutionality of the rape and sodomy statutes as violative
of the equal protection rights of unmarried men under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 121 He also alleged that because
the forcible rape statute was gender specific, it unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of sex. 12 2
The state's highest court agreed with both constitutional attacks. In
particular, the Court held that there was "no rational basis for distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have
been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions
...or are unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny."123 In addition, the
court rejected several of the modem justifications for the marital exemption. 124
The court declared that the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute,
115474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
1 16

1d. at 569.

1 17M.
1 18

1d.

119 Under the New York Penal Code "[a] man is guilty of rape in the first degree when
he engages in sexual intercourse with a female.., by forcible compulsion." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1987). A female is defined as "any female person who is not
married to the actor." § 130.00(4).
120
A person is considered unmarried when the female and actor are living apart
pursuant to an "order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction which by its terms or
in its effect requires such living apart .. § 130.00(4)(b)(i).
121Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 571.
1221d.
123Id.
at 572.
12 41d.

at 573-75. See supra notes 74,88, 92 and accompanying text.
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125 Since only the
as well as its gender specifications, were unconstitutional.
general rape statute was struck down, Liberta's
exemption and not the
126
conviction was upheld.
In defering to the New York legislature, the court chose not to strike down
the entire rape statute, chosing instead to strike only the marital and gender
exemptions. 127 As a result of the court's action the legislature enacted a new
rape statute, which states: "that any person who engages in sexual intercourse
is guilty of either rape in the
... with any other person by forcible compulsion
128
degree."
first
the
first degree or sodomy in
Liberta has impacted the future of the marital exemption. Indeed, several
courts have followed the constitutional arguments set forth in this opinion to
strike down the marital exemption. 129 In order to abolish the marital exemption
completely, more courts, like the Liberta court, must be willing to strike down
statutes which are discriminatory and based on archaic, outdated notions.
Courts which give great deference to the legislative process and will not strike
down poorly constructed statutes impede the national campaign for
13°
abolishment of the marital exemption.

C. Status of Abolishment Among the Several States
The national campaign for abolishment of the marital exemption has had
significant success since the early 1980's. In 1980, only three states had
13 1 At that time, there were ten
completely abolished the marital exemption.
be
states which had an absolute exemption where a husband could never
13 2 A
married.
legally
were
parties
the
as
long
as
prosecuted for raping his wife
divorced. 133
prosecution could only be successful when the parties were legally 134
Currently, no state belongs in this "absolute exemption" category.

12 5
12 6

Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573-75.
1d. at 579.

12 71d. at 578-79.
12 8Id. at 579.
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 494 So.2d 819 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Shunn v. State,
742 P.2d 775 (Wyo. 1987).
130
State v. Smith, 372 A.2d 386, 393 (Essex County Ct. 1977). "[Itis more properly a
legislative, rather than a judicial function, to determine or redetermine the type of
conduct which will constitute the substantive crime of rape, especially when, as here,
serious societal objectives, philosophical evaluations and moral judgments are
involved." Id.
131Oregon, Nebraska, and New Jersey. See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 21.
129

132

1d. at 375.

13 3

1d.

34

1 Id.
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In the 1980"s the goal of the national campaign was to make marital rape, at
least in most circumstances, a crime in every state.1 35 Since this first step has
been achieved, the goal of the national campaign is now to abolish completely

all remnants of the marital exemption.1 36
Today, there are three main categories of marital exemption law. 13 7 The first
category consists of those states in which a husband cannot be prosecuted for

rape unless the couple is living apart, legally separated, or has filed for divorce
or order of protection. 138 In the four states which have this type of

exemption, 139 Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, the burden

is on the wife to leave her husband or file for divorce. 140 If she fails to do so,
the state will not be able to prosecute her husband if he rapes her. The states in
this first category provide the least protection to married women.
The second category of states are those in which husbands can be prosecuted

for raping their wives in certain circumstances, but are exempt from
prosecution in other situations that are prosecutable for non-marital rape.141
There are twenty-four states which fall into this second category of partial

exemptions. 142 A majority of these "partial exemption" states exempt husbands

only from prosecution of "less harmful" forms of rape-those that do not
involve force or threat of force. 14 3 There are sixteen states which fall into this
category: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Washington, and Wyoming. 1 44 California, Illinois, and Washington also

13 5

Id.

13 6

See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 25.

13 7

d. at 23.

13 8

1d.

13 9

Id. at 23, 377-82. This state law chart shows eight states in this category as of
January, 1990. Updated information on states' activities from 1990-1993 was supplied
by The National Clearinghouse on Marital & Date Rape, supra note 102.
140S~e KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.030
(Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (Law.
Co-op. 1985).
14

1RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 21.

14 2

d. at 23, 377-82.

14 3

Id. at 377-82.
144 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404-06 (Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West
Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67(b) (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763-775
(Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-732 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (Supp. 1993);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/115-11.1 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3501-3 (Supp. 1992);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 27-464D (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (1991); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3103 (Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-610 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010 (Supp. 1993); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-307 (1995).
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require that the wife report the rape within a certain period of time, ranging
from 30 to 90 days. Four states have a partial exemption which exempt
husbands from prosecution for the more serious first degree rape.145 Instead,
husbands can only be charged with a lesser crime of rape. Another group of
states with a partial exemption only exempt husbands who rape their wives
146
who are under the age of consent or who are mentally or physically disabled.
Lastly, there are those states which have no marital rape exemption. There
are twenty-two states which have completely abolished the marital rape
to make no distinction between "marital rape" and
exemption--choosing
"non-marital rape."14 7 The states in this category correctly recognize that the
archaic common law notions and modem justifications are inadequate to
support the marital rape exemption. The goal of those opposed to the marital
exemption is to push the remaining twenty-eight states which have not
completely abolished the marital rape exemption into this final category.
TV. OHIO'S PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

A. Legislative History
148
Ohio has been a partial exemption state for the past nine years. Prior to
March 7, 1986, Ohio did not recognize marital rape unless the parties had a
written separation agreement or a court action had been filed to dissolve the
marriage. 14 9 Ohio moved forward with the enactment of House Bill 475 in 1985,

14 5

See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (Supp. 1993); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21-02(a), 21-12
(West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-6
(Supp. 1995).
146 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520 (1991);
MINN. STAT. § 609.349 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A2, A3, A5 (Supp. 1993); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (Supp. 1993). See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 377, which states that
Arkansas' statute is silent on whether husbands who do not have minor wives can be
convicted of rape.
147 See generally ALASKA STAT. § 11.41-443 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-3-401 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-1(a) (1992); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1(b) (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.41-43 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A §§ 251,252 (West Supp. 1993);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265 § 22 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-95 to 103 (1991); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-506 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:14-5b (1982);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01, 02 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402, 407 (Supp. 1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1993).
See also RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 377-382. For New York law see supra notes 112-130 and
accompanying text. For Alabama law see Merton v. State, 500 So.2d 1301 (Ala. 1988).
The updated information has been provided by the National Clearinghouse on Marital
& Date Rape. See supra note 102.
148

See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 23.

14 9

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L), .02 (Anderson 1993).
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which recognized that rape is a crime under certain specific circumstances
when a husband and wife are living together.150 This recognition placed Ohio
in the partial marital exemption category. Ohio rape law, however, will not
advance to full equality for married women until it joins the category of states
which have completely abolished the exemption.
Prior to the changes made to Ohio's rape statute in 1986, Ohio Revised Code
2907.02(A)(1) read: "No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another,
not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply...."151 Section
2907.01(L) defines spouse as "a person married to an offender at the time of an
alleged offense .... " 152 Section 2907.01(L) further states that a person is not
considered a spouse when there has been a written separation agreement, a
petition for dissolution of marriage, or a legal action for separation. 153 These
two sections read together made it impossible for a woman who was living
with her husband to prosecute him for rape.154
The years of 1985 and 1986 were busy ones for the Ohio legislature in dealing
with marital rape exemption issues. In 1985, Senate Bill 17 was proposed by
Senator Michael White to eliminate spousal immunity from the offense of rape
and felonious sexual penetration. 155 This Bill was a result of a recommendation
by the Governor's Task Force on Family Violence. 156 The Governor's Task
Force suggested that section 2907.02 of the Ohio Revised Code be amended so
that husbands could be prosecuted for raping their wives. 157 The Task Force
concluded that rape should not be defined by the legal or social relationship
between the victim and the offender. 158
Senate Bill 17, if enacted, would have abolished the marital exemption from
section 2907.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. The strength of the bill a rose from

150
H.B. 475, 116th General Assembly, Regular Sess., §§ 2907 et seq. (1985-1986)
[hereinafter H.B. 475].
151

Id.

52

1 OHIo REVISED CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L) (Anderson 1993).
153

1d.

54

1 See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
155S.B. 17, 116th General Assembly, Regular Sess., §§ 2907 et seq. (1985-1986)
[hereinafter S.B. 17]. H.B. 63, 116th General Assembly, Regular Sess. was identical to
S.B. 17 as proposed by Senator Sheerer.
15 6 Letter from Richard F. Celeste, Governor of Ohio, to Paul E. Pfeifer, State Senator
from Bucyrus (Oct. 9, 1985).
1571d.
158

1d. The Governor concluded from the Task Force's recommendation that "spousal
rape is one facet of the total family violence picture and should receive the same serious
consideration by the General Assembly as other forms of violence and abuse." Id. See
also Make Spousal Rape A Crime In Ohio, Task Force Urges, FINDLAY COURIER, Dec. 28,1984,
at A10.
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159
the fact that it did not contain the word "spouse". The Bill read "No person
shall engage in sexual conduct with another when ... (1) The offender
purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force....",160
as opposed to the pre-1986 section 2907.02 which had the language "who is not
the spouse of the offender."161 The main thrust of the Bill was the addition of
section G, which read "[i]t is not a defense to a charge under this section that
the offender and the victim were married or were cohabiting at the time of the
commission of the offense." 162 With the addition of this section, Senate Bill 17
would have abolished spousal immunity from the Ohio rape statute and Ohio
would presently be categorized as a progressive state on this issue.
In 1985, however, Senate Bill 17 caused great controversy. Although
segments of the Bill were eventually attached to House Bill 475 which passed
163
in 1985, Senate Bill 17 was never heard by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The chairperson of that Committee, Senator Paul Pfeifer, refused to begin
hearings on the Bill. 164 Senator Michael White attempted for more than ten
months to schedule Senate Bill 17 for hearings. 165 He made several requests to
Senator Pfeifer, in addition to having other senators and Governor Celeste write
166
In
letters to Senator Pfeifer, urging the Committee to take action on the Bill.
a press release by Senator White's Office, he said that he would appeal to the
Committee members since he had exhausted all other ways in which to get the
committee to begin hearings on the Bill. 167 Senator White claimed that Senator
Pfeifer based his refusal to hear the Bill on his adherence to 17th century legal
philosophy which proclaimed that women gave up their right to consent when
they married. 168
Several Ohio newspapers captured the spirit of the heated controversy.
Senator Pfeifer's reasons for not hearing Senate Bill 17 were reportedly based
on several of the meritless modem justifications, i.e. that any time a married
couple had a fight the wife would go to the prosecutor's office and file a rape

159

S.B. 17, supranote 155.

160Id. at § 2907.02(A).
161
See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
162

S.B. 17, supranote 155, at § 2907.02(G).

163Memorandum from Michael R. White, State Senator from Cleveland, to All
Democratic Senators in Ohio (Oct. 2,1985).
164Id.
165 Id.
166

1d. See also letter from Michael White, State Senator from Cleveland, to Paul E.
Gillmor, President of the Ohio Senate (Oct. 2, 1985) (on file with the National
Clearinghouse on Marital & Date Rape, supra note 102).
167Press Release from Senator Michael White's Office (Oct. 8, 1985) (on file with the
National Clearinghouse on Marital & Date Rape, supranote 102).
168

1d.
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charge 16 9 and that women would use rape charges as a weapon in separation
and divorce settlements. 170 Senator Pfeifer also argued that marital rape is too
difficult to prove and therefore should not be a crime. 171 His argument that
abolishing the marital rape exemption would be unworkable, because it would

create a burden on prosecutors, led to the demise of the Bill. It was never heard
by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 1 72
The battle did not end with Senator Pfeifer's refusal to hear Senate Bill 17.
Portions of that Bill were amended to Representative Davidson's Domestic

Violence Bill, House Bill 475, in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 173 Senator
White managed to have the Judiciary Committee vote on an amendment which
permitted the filing of spousal rape charges when the rape occurs while a
couple is living apart and when the rape is committed under force or threat of

force when the couple is living together.174 The amendment to the Domestic
Violence Bill was approved by a 29 to 2 vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee,
despite Pfeifer's efforts. 175 The Bill was returned to the House for review of the
amendment along with other changes made by the Senate. 176 On December 6,
1985 it was approved, and the Bill became effective March 7, 1986.177
B. Ohio's Current Rape Statute
Senator White criticized Senator Pfeifer's efforts to include a marital rape
provision in the Domestic Violence Bill by claiming that it was a "half-hearted

169

See Mary A. Sharkey, Pfeifer Holds up Billfor Marital Rape Law, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 2, 1985, at 1-A.
17 0

See James Bradshaw, Bill Would Allow Women to Charge Husbands With Rape, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1985, at 4B. See also Lee Leonard, Senate Unit Shuns Attempt
at Spousal Rape Legislation, COLUMBUS CITIZEN J., Oct. 3,1985, at 3A.
171 See also supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
172 See Pfeifer Wrong about Rape Law, MEDINA COUNTY GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1985, at A4.
173

H.B. 475, supra note 150. In addition to limiting spousal immunity, Davidson's
Domestic Violence Bill (House Bill 475) dealt with permitting spouses to testify against
each other in prosecution of such offenses, to increase the penalty for subsequent
violations of domestic violence protection orders or consent agreements, to require
courts to consider certain factors when setting bail for persons who commit domestic
violence, to permit the ordering of a psychiatric examination of persons who violate
such order or agreements, and to authorize a court that sentences a person for domestic
violence or violating such an order or agreement to place the person on probation for
treatment if he has a drug or alcohol problem. Id.
174
See Mary G. Poldomani, Ohio Senate Toughens Day-Care, Rape Bills, THE AKRON
BEAcoN J., Nov. 15,1985, at Dl.
175

Id.

176

See Poldomani, supra note 174.

77

1 See H.B. 475, supra note 150.
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attempt to placate the thousands of Ohioans on the issue of marital rape.' 178
Indeed, the amendment which passed failed to resolve the marital rape issue
because the changes simply moved Ohio from the category of states that do
not recognize spousal rape as a crime to the category of "partial exemption"
states that recognize rape as a crime only in limited circumstances. 179 While
House Bill 475 placed Ohio on the proper path for complete abolishment of the
marital rape exemption, there have been no changes (see HB 395180next section)
to the marital exemption since House Bill 475 became effective.
Currently, Ohio's partial marital rape exemption statute is ambiguous and
inconsistent. The statute provides that husbands cannot be prosecuted for the
rape of their wives if the two live together, but a person can be prosecuted for
rape if the spouse-victim lives separately and apart from the offender. 18 1
However, when a person engages in sexual conduct with another and compels
the other to submit by force or threat of force, the fact that the offender and
182
victim were married, or cohabiting, will not be a defense to the crime of rape.
If the statute had provided that marriage was not a defense to any form of rape,
then Ohio would have completely abolished the marital rape exemption.
Unfortunately, the statute is worded in such a way that when a husband
substantially impairs his wife's judgment or control by drugs or intoxicants in
order to prevent her resistance, a husband cannot be prosecuted for raping his
wife. 183 Hence, a woman who lives with her husband without a written
separation agreement, or a petition for dissolution of marriage, is not legally
protected from being raped if she is drugged or intoxicated by force, threat of
force, or deception. 84
C. Proposalfor Ohio's CompleteAbolishment
Ohio is not alone in the partial marital exemption category,185 but Ohio
legislators have not offered a legitimate justification for allowing husbands to
escape prosecution when they drug or intoxicate their wives in order to rape
them. Ohio's rape statute needs to be amended to allow the prosecution of any
178

Press release from Senator Michael White's Office (Oct. 3, 1985).

179 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Anderson 1993).
180

1d.

181§ 2907.02(A)(1). For the definition of "spouse" see § 2907.01(L).
182§ 2907.02(G). This same idea that being married is not a defense applies in the
felonious sexual penetration statute. § 2907.12. However, the marital rape exemption
still applies for the sex offenses of sexual battery, gross sexual imposition, and sexual
imposition. § 2907.03, .05, .06.
183§ 2907.02(A)(1)(a), .02(G).
184§ 2907.01(A)(1), .01(A)(1)(a). Additionally, a woman who is drugged or intoxicated
by her husband will not be able to prosecute him for felonious sexual penetration.
§ 2907.12(A)(1)(a).
185
See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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husband who rapes another person in all circumstances, whether the victim is
the offender's spouse or not. Two simple amendments should be applied to
section 2907.02 which would completely abolish the marital rape exemption.
First, the word "spouse" should be removed from the main provision in the
statute so that it would read "[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another. ... " This is the most important step in treating married and unmarried
women equally.
The second amendment should be the addition of a provision that clearly
states that this section applies whether or not the offender is married to the
victim. Section 2907.02(G) should read that it is not a defense to a charge of rape
under any provision in this statute "that the offender and the victim were
married or were cohabiting at the time of the commission of the offense." 186
Utah, North Carolina, and Alaska have recently amended their rape statutes
by adding a provision stating that marriage is never a defense to the crime of
7
rape.18
The question that needs to be addressed is why Ohio should change its rape
statute to reflect a complete abolishment of the marital rape exemption? The
answer is embedded in a fundamental notion of respect for a woman's
autonomy and the basic right to control the use of her own body. Within the
past decade, numerous states have changed their statutes to reflect a complete
abolishment of the marital rape exemption.188 The only explanation for these
changes in marital rape exemption laws is that there has been a very slow, but
steady, realization that married women are not chattel of their husbands and
that they deserve equal protection of the laws, whether they are raped by their
husband or any other man.189 The complete removal of Ohio's marital
exemption will give married women the power to assert the physical integrity
of their bodies. 190 Any remaining vestiges of spousal immunity in Ohio's rape
law should be destroyed because "if women are to be what we believe we are
-equal partners - then intercourse must be construed as an act of mutual desire
and not as a wifely 'duty' enforced by the permissible threat of bodily harm or
of economic sanctions."191 Ohio legislators have no reason not to amend the
current rape statute. As discussed in Part II of this Note, the common law
origins and modem justifications for upholding any form of spousal immunity

186 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(G) (Anderson 1993). Senate Bill 17 proposed
these exact changes, but was never accepted. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying
text.
18 7 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.443 (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (Supp. 1993).
188

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.

189

See generally RUSSELL, supranote 6, at introduction. See also Williams, supra note 39,
at 176-79.
190 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 51.
191

BROWNMLLER, supra note 4, at 381.
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are meritless because they are based on archaic and sexist rationales that should
no longer play a role in our modem society.
D. Current Attempts at Change in Ohio
The Ohio Legislature has recently taken a step toward the abolishment of
the marital rape exemption and all other forms of spousal immunity present
in other criminal offenses with the proposal of House Bill 395 by Representative
Betty Sutton. 192 This Bill specifies that the language from the rape 193 and
felonious sexual penetration 194 statutes stating that it is "nota defense that the
offender and the victim were married or were cohabiting at the time of the
commission of the offense" should be added to twenty-three other criminal
offenses in the Ohio Revised Code.1 95 The offenses to which the new provision
would be added are: aggravated murder, murder, voluntary manslaughter,
involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, aggravated assault, assault,
aggravated menacing, menacing by stalking, menacing, kidnapping,
abduction, extortion, sexual battery, aggravated arson in instances in which a
risk of physical harm to a person is involved, arson, aggravated robbery,
robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated trespass, intimidation, and
intimidation of a crime victim or witness. 19 6 The Bill also expands the existing
specification for rape and felonious sexual penetration to state that it is not a
or were cohabiting "prior
defense that the offender and the victim were married
197
to" the time of the commission of the offense.
Although at first glance this Bill seems to rid the Ohio penal code of all
remnants of spousal immunity, this is not the case. The Bill does not apply to
the offenses of gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition, nor does the Bill
remove Ohio from the partial marital rape exemption category. 198 However,
despite the fact that the Bill would not resolve every issue, if approved by the
legislature, Ohio would be one step closer to obtaining the complete
abolishment of the marital rape exemption. Unfortunately, on December 29,
1994, House Bill 395 died in the House Judiciary Committee, but there are plans
to reintroduce it in 1995.199 If the bill is eventually passed it will show a

192H.B.

395, 120th General Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993-1994) (introduced on June
3,1993 by Representative Sutton, D-Barberton) [hereinafter H.B. 395].
193§ 2907.02(G).
194§ 2907.12(C).
195See H.B. 395, supra note 192.
196
1d. See also §§ 2903.01-.04, .11-.13, .21-.22, 2905.01, .02, .11, 2907.03, 2909.02, .03,
2911.01, .02, .11, .12, .211,2921.03, .04.
19 7
See H.B. 395, supra note 192.

198 Id. See also § 2907.05,

.06.

99

1 Telephone interview with the Ohio Legislative Information Bureau and
Representative Betty Sutton's office on Jan. 17,1995.
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recognition and awareness by those in political power that spousal immunity
should not exist in any form of Ohio law.
E. Marital Rape in Ohio
When speaking in legislative terms, one can lose sight of the reasons and
motivations for wanting to change the law. The primary motivation for urging
complete abolishment of Ohio's marital rape exemption is to give married
women the right to prosecute their attackers in all situations, regardless of the
marital relationship of the victim and the perpetrator. Since House Bill 475
became effective in 1986, there have been a number of cases in Ohio where a
husband has been prosecuted for raping his wife.200 The fact that marital rape
does occur in Ohio and that married women have used the statute to prosecute
their husbands should alert the legislators, as well as Ohio residents, that
changing rape laws to reflect equality among married and unmarried women
is an issue worthy of social, legislative, and judicial attention.
Nevertheless, although there have been instances of husbands being
prosecuted and convicted for raping their wives in Ohio, if Ohio law were to
completely abolish the marital exemption, more women who have been raped
by their husbands may be encouraged to prosecute them based on the premise
that all forms of marital rape are criminal. 201 Changing the law is pivotal to
deterrence because too few husbands recognize that marital rape is
unacceptable and too many wives believe that they do not have a right to refuse
their husbands sexual advances. 202 If Ohio law is changed to reflect complete
abolishment of the marital rape exemption it will set the moral boundaries
which will remind husbands that they can be prosecuted for raping their wives
and that wives have the right to prosecute their husbands for rape.203
The fact that Ohio does have instances of marital rape and that women are
exercising their right to prosecute their husbands 20 4 for rape should be an
encouraging sign to Ohio legislators that they are on their way to providing
equal rape laws to married women. This battle should not stop until the issue
is completely resolved, and full resolution can only occur when Ohio places
itself in the category of states which have completely abolished the marital rape
exemption.

200

See, e.g., Jim Dillon, CedarvilleMan FacingCharges Under New Spousal-RapeLaw, THE
DAYTON DAILY NEws, June 19, 1986, at 14; Julia Helgason, 2 Cases: 1 Conviction, I
Acquittal, THE DAYTON DAILY NEWS, April 8, 1990, at 1A; Michele Lesie, Spousal Rape
Confiusing to Men, Women, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 1, 1991, at 4A; Scott Stephens, Elyria
Man Guilty of Raping PregnantWife, THE PLAIN DEALER Aug. 14,1993, at lB.
201

20

See FINKELHOR & YLLo, supra note 2, at 198.

2Sd.

203Id.
20)4See Stephens, supra note 200.
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V. SUGGESTIONS TO ADVANCE THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR COMPLETE
ABOLISHMENT OF THE MARITAL EXEMPTION

There are numerous steps that need to be taken in order to accomplish the
goal of eliminating existing marital rape exemption statutes nationwide. The
first step is to criminalize marital rape in the four holdout states which do not
recognize rape as a crime when a husband and wife live together.205 The second
step is to change the law in the twenty-four states which have partial marital
rape exemption statutes. 206 One way to effectuate these changes is for citizens
to lobby the legislature of each state for change. In those states where the
marital rape law is unsatisfactory, women can organize a class action suit in an
attempt to strike down the marital exemption or partial marital exemption as
unconstitutional. 20 7 Additionally, in these four holdout states where marital
rape is still not prosecutable when the spouses live together, women can try to
208
sue their husbands for damages in civil court.
Perhaps the most effective way to achieve these essential legislative changes

is to change the underlying social conditions which have fostered spousal
immunity.2 09 Women need to be empowered with improved economic and
social opportunities so that they are not vulnerable partners in marriage. 210
However, deeply embedded in our culture exists a sexist ideology about
women's sexuality which has fostered violence against women.211 In order for
women to have control over their own bodies this ideology must be forgotten.
But, because these views are embedded in the fundamental values of our
society, changing sexist ideologies has been and will continue to be a very slow
212
and arduous experience.

One way in which to change the sexist views about women in our society
may be to elect more women legislators. 213 With more women making law,
there will arguably be a greater concern and awareness for issues which affect
women. 214 This may spur the awareness of women and men that marital rape
should be a crime and that married women do have the right to choose how to
use their own bodies. 2 15
2 05

See RUSSELL, supranote 6, at 25. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.

2 06

See RUSSELL, supranote 6, at 25. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.

20 7

See RUSSELL, supranote 6, at 25.

208

Id.

209

See FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 2, at 186.

210

1d. at 187.

21 1

Id.

212

1d.

213

See RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 26.

2 4

1 1d.

215 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 51.
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Removing the marital exemption is viewed as an educational statement
about the rights of partners in marriage. 216 If the goal is to promote a society
where there is a belief in the equal worth of women and that marriage is based
on equality and partnership, 2 17 then the only logical step toward promoting
this goal is to completely abolish all remnants of spousal immunity in the
law.2 18
These changes in the law will neither be easy nor sudden, but an awareness
that marital rape is wrong will lead to changes in the law. With women gaining
more political power and equality, eventually states will have no choice but to
completely abolish the marital rape exemption giving every woman the
freedom to use her own body as she chooses.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the past two decades there has been a massive amount of legislative
activity dealing with the marital rape exemption. The national campaign for
complete abolishment of the marital rape exemption has made great strides in
its attempt to legally change the sexist and archaic ideology that a woman is
the property of her husband and that when a woman marries, she consents to
unconditional sexual intercourse with her husband. This idea came from the
common law origins of the 17th century and has lasted until the present day.
In the later half of the 20th century, these common law origins have been
rejected by the courts as justifications for the marital rape exemption. Since
these common law origins have been abandoned, defenders of the marital rape
exemption have attempted to come up with modem justifications for the
marital rape exemption, such as the inappropriate invasion of marital privacy
and harm to the marital bond. However, these modem justifications are based
on weak and sexist arguments that also have been rejected by the courts.
The marital exemption should be given priority by legislators until it is
completely abolished in every state. Partial exemption states, such as Ohio,
should follow the lead of other states which have amended their statutes to
reflect complete abolishment of the marital exemption. Since there is no legal
or logical basis for the marital exemption, Ohio, as well as all other states who
have any form of a marital exemption, should amend their statutes to promote
a society where women are equal partners in marriage and have the right to
control access to their own bodies.
LALENYA WEINTRAUB SIEGEL

2 16

1d.

2 17

d. at 35.

218

See Waterman, supra note 16, at 621.
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